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1. INTRODUCTION
Yugoslavia is a singularly unique nation. It first attracted the at-
tention of international businesspersons and lawyers when, in 1967, it
became the first socialist nation' to enact legislation permitting foreign
investment in the form of joint ventures.2 This action marked the be-
ginning of Yugoslavia's efforts to promote closer commercial ties with
the West. Such ties permitted the Yugoslavs to take advantage of the
resulting influx of capital, skills and technology in order to further de-
velop their own economy. Soon after, other Eastern European nations
followed with joint venture legislation of their own.3 However, Yugo-
slavia's approach to foreign investment is markedly different from those
of the nations which followed its lead.
Although Yugoslavia is a socialist nation, its economy is free from
the centralized state planning characteristic of other Eastern European
states. Basic decisions regarding production and distribution are left to
the commercial enterprises themselves via a system of worker self-man-
agement.4 Workers make virtually all such decisions through various
* J.D., 1990, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 1987, University of
Pennsylvania.
I See Buzescu, Joint-Ventures in Eastern Europe, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 407, 408
(1984); Coronna, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia, 11 KINGSTON L. REv. 266'(1981);
Coughlin, An Economic Analysis of Yugoslav Joint Ventures, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L.
12 (1983); Comment, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 163
(1984).
' Law on Investment of Resources of Foreign Persons in Domestic Organizations
of Associated Labor, July 10, 1967.
' Romania enacted joint venture legislation in 1971; Hungary in 1972; Poland in
1976; and Bulgaria in 1980. See Buzescu, supra note 1, at 408-09.
" For general explanations of the workings of the Yugoslav worker self-manage-
ment system, see Buzescu, supra note 1, at 415-16; Goldstajn, Yugoslav Foreign Trade
Law: A General Survey, 6 REV. SOCIALIST L. 325, 327-28 (1980); Sajko, Enterprise
(789)
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organizations and committees. This system promotes a degree of eco-
nomic flexibility that makes the promotion of closer ties with the West
all the more feasible.
The legal climate in Yugoslavia is also conducive to further inte-
gration with the West. Its laws pertaining to contracts and conflicts of
laws permit parties doing business in Yugoslavia the freedom to choose,
within certain limitations, which nation's laws will govern their deal-
ings. This same latitude is also given to parties to choose the applicable
form of arbitration should arbitration be necessary. Yugoslav laws are
quite amenable to the resolution of disputes through the arbitration
process. There already exist various commercial agreements between
Yugoslavia and the West - in particular with the European Economic
Community - which demonstrate the extent to which Yugoslavia is on
its way to integrating its economy with those of the West.
Yugoslavia would benefit from closer ties with Western Europe by
virtue of the technology and management skills it would develop, and
by the placement of its products in foreign markets.5 The Yugoslav
economy, which has faltered and performed unevenly in recent years,6
would benefit from the economic development likely to follow a merger
with the EEC. Individual Yugoslavs would benefit from EEC laws
which allow great mobility for workers within the Community.' The
EEC would benefit from such a merger because of Yugoslavia's strate-
gic position between the bulk of the Community's Member States, Tur-
key, and the Near East.' A merger would allow the EEC to expand
and diversify its economic base. The resulting strengthening of the Yu-
goslav economy would further serve to unify and strengthen the econo-
Organization of East European Socialist Countries - A Creative Approach, 61 TUL.
L. REv. 1365, 1376-81 (1987); Scriven, Joint Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe:
A Practical Guide,
21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 633, 640-42 (1980).
5 See Goldstajn, The Relationship of Yugoslavia and the EEC, 18 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 569, 570 (1981).
8 As of 1987, Yugoslavia's foreign debt was $19 billion, its unemployment rate
15%, and its inflation rate 100%. See Comment, The Yugoslav Gastarbeiter: The Guest
Who Stayed For Dinner, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 181, 187 (1987).
' Freedom of worker mobility is a core principle of the Community. See Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, tit. III, ch. 1, arts.
48-51 (amended 1987), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. Maintaining
the mobility of Yugoslav workers is a crucial economic need, because to require them to
return to Yugoslavia for work would greatly worsen the unemployment situation in
Yugoslavia. See generally Comment, supra note 6 (arguing that repatriation of Yugo-
slav guest workers from West Germany would be harmful to both countries). Presuma-
bly, the greater freedom to send Yugoslav workers abroad that would follow from a
merger with the EEC would benefit the Yugoslav economy even more, as it would
bring more foreign currency into Yugoslavia and lessen the problem of unemployment.
8 See Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 570.
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mies of all the Community States.
This comment takes the position that the European Economic
Community should soon open its doors again and admit Yugoslavia as
its thirteenth member.9 The first section will describe the present legal
environment in Yugoslavia regarding economic ties with the West. This
examination will demonstrate that Yugoslavia is committed to the pur-
suit of further integration, and that many of the basic legal elements
needed for Community admission either already exist or are only a step
away. The second section will attempt to reconcile the Yugoslav need
for economic, legal and political independence with the demands of the
Community for extensive integration.
2. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA REGARDING
ECONOMIc TIES WITH THE WEST
2.1. Joint Ventures
The most sophisticated and thoroughly analyzed aspect of Yugo-
slavia's economic ties with the West is the area of joint ventures. Yugo-
slavia's laws in this area have undergone significant changes since the
passage of the original legislation in 1967.10 These changes have al-
lowed foreign investors to own larger percentages of the joint ventures,
to reap higher shares of the profits, and to have a greater degree of
control over the operations of the ventures. The Yugoslav government's
unwillingness to sacrifice the existing structure of its economy in order
to effect such changes also reveals a particular strength of the Yugoslav
effort to integrate with the West.
The goal of Yugoslavia and other Eastern European nations in
encouraging foreign investment is to "modernize and accelerate eco-
nomic development."'" The hope is that such joint projects will allow
the Yugoslav counterparts in these ventures to "gain access to the re-
sults of advanced Research and Development ... hence speeding up the
inflow of new technology.' 1 2 For a developing nation such as Yugosla-
via, the prospect of tapping into Western sources of technology and
resources has provided a strong incentive to liberalize laws regarding
foreign investment. Similarly, there are many reasons why a Western
The European Economic Community is presently comprised of the following
nations: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. See 1
THE EUROPA WORLD Y.B. 1989, 134.
10 See Artisien & Buckley, Western Investment and the New Law in Yugoslavia,
19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 522, 528 (1985).
" Buzescu, supra note 1, at 413.
12 Artisien & Buckley, supra note 10, at 528.
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enterprise would wish to invest in such joint ventures: protecting an
existing market; countering increasing Yugoslav competition; and sim-
ply developing new market opportunities in Yugoslavia. 3
The pressures on both sides to undertake these joint ventures
prompted the Yugoslav government to enact its 1978 Foreign Invest-
ment Law.14 This law set out the rights of both foreign and domestic
partners and established rules for the operations of these ventures
within the Yugoslav system. The law first set out to guarantee certain
specific protections for the ventures. Yugoslavia guarantees that foreign
partners will be compensated for any governmental appropriation of
real estate belonging to the joint venture,'" and that any regulatory
changes affecting the rights of the foreign investor enacted after the
execution of a joint venture agreement will not apply unless they are
more favorable than the old regulations. 16 These protections for foreign
investors are codified in the Yugoslav Constitution.'7 Such protections
create a climate that is more conducive to foreign investment by
"provid[ing] the foreign investor with a stable and predictable economic
environment in which to operate the joint venture."' s
Yugoslavia not only provides assurances to the foreign investors in
joint ventures; it also treats joint ventures as it does other domestic en-
terprises. "Because the form of the joint venture is that of a normal
organization of associated labor, [it] exercises the same rights as any
other Yugoslav work organization."' 9 In this capacity, a joint venture
can participate in the social compacts and social plans20 that substitute
for centralized state planning, and it can compete in the marketplace by
selling to any domestic consumer.2' The equal treatment of joint ven-
tures acts as an incentive to foreign investors by creating a greater mea-
sure of uniformity in applying the laws. Foreigners demand this higher
degree of predictability in order to invest.
The unique aspect of foreign investments in Yugoslavia is that the
forms which the investments take and the regulations governing them
must conform to the already existing structure of the Yugoslav economy
13 See Comment, supra note 1, at 169.
'4 Law on Investment of Resources of Foreign Persons in Domestic (Yugoslav)
Organizations of Associated Labor (1978), 18 I.L.M. 230 (1978) [hereinafter 1978
Foreign Investment Law].
15 See Scriven, supra note 4, at 661.
16 However, this latter provision does not apply to taxation or "contributions to
the social community." Id.
17 See Buzescu, supra note 1, at 435.
's Scriven, supra note 4, at 662.
IS Id. at 654.
20 See id. at 654 n.134.
21 See id. at 654.
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and its present legal system. As mentioned earlier, the Yugoslav econ-
omy is based upon the concept of worker self-management.22 Workers
make all decisions regarding the operations of the enterprise, including
the production and distribution of goods, the allocation of profits, and
the appropriate levels of reinvestment. On a macro scale, the entire
economy is integrated not by centralized governmental plans, but rather
through social compacts arrived at by various representatives of the
business sector.23
Other Eastern European nations,24 in efforts to make their nations
more attractive to foreign investors, have enacted joint venture laws that
are alien to their present legal and economic systems.25 Thus, business-
people and governmental officials are unfamiliar with their own laws.26
The result can only be general confusion and uncertainty among both
domestic and foreign investors.
Yugoslavia, however, requires foreign investments in the form of
joint ventures to operate within the existing Yugoslav system.27 Specifi-
cally, joint ventures must conform to the worker self-management sys-
tem that characterizes the Yugoslav economy. Although such a require-
ment may initially scare off potential foreign investors unfamiliar with
the unique Yugoslav system, the demand for such conformity actually
proves beneficial for investors. Joint ventures, because they must oper-
ate as any other enterprise, "form an integral part of the Yugoslav bus-
iness community,"28 and their integration into this system makes their
subsequent chances for financial success all the better. "Perhaps this
important aspect of the form and constitution of the Yugoslav joint ven-
ture entity has been a major reason for Yugoslavia's vastly superior
22 For discussions of the Yugoslav self-management system, see generally supra
note 4.
23 For discussions of Yugoslav Social Compacts, see generally supra note 20. For
a brief discussion of the United States' classification of Yugoslavia as a non-state-con-
trolled economy, see Cuneo & Manuel, Roadblock to Trade: The State-Controlled
Economy Issue in Antidumping Law Administration, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277, 289
n.64 (1981-82). "Yugoslavia is widely considered, and considers itself, to be a commu-
nist country with a market economy." Id. at 277 n.2. Reasons for classification as a
non-state-controlled economy include direct exercise of decision-making power by those
directly affected by the decisions; profit-oriented enterprises; "indicative" rather than
binding national economic plans; and a market exchange rate for the dinar which pro-
vides a reliable reflector of its value.
2' For descriptions of the joint venture laws of other Eastern European nations,
see generally Buzescu, supra note 1.
2 See Scriven, supra note 4, at 642.
26 Id.
27 See Buzescu, supra note 1, at 415-16; Coughlin, supra note 1, at 13; Scriven,
supra note 4, at 640-42.
28 Scriven, supra note 4, at 642.
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record in attracting foreign investment."29
While Yugoslavia requires foreign investment to conform to its ex-
isting system, the nation is not inflexible when it comes to attracting
and accommodating foreign investment. The creation of a management
body known as the Joint Business Board, and the enactment of amend-
ments to the Joint Venture Laws, demonstrate this flexibility.
One of the most important concerns of foreigners investing in Yu-
goslavia was that the Yugoslav worker self-management system allowed
the workers a very strong say in the operations of the joint venture.
Foreign investors believed that Yugoslav requirements of domestic con-
trol limited their ability to manage the ventures effectively and left such
control to the domestic partners and the workers.30 The issue of manag-
ing joint ventures was treated somewhat ambiguously by the 1976 For-
eign Investment Laws. The source of the ambiguity and occasional con-
fusion was a struggle between foreign investors' desire to exercise
strong influence in the management of the venture and the rights of
Yugoslav workers to self-management"' as guaranteed by the Yugoslav
Constitution.2
The answer to the problem was the introduction into each joint
venture entity of the Joint Business Board,33 a committee composed of
the foreign partners and their representatives and the domestic partners
and workers.34 The exact composition of each Business Board was to be
determined through the negotiating process that created the joint ven-
ture itself, provided that the arrangement met with the approval of ap-
propriate federal authorities. 5 The only restriction on the composition
of the Board was that the General Director must have been nominated
by the domestic partner. 6 Despite the apparent balance in manage-
ment authority between foreigners and domestics that the creation of
the Joint Business Board seemed to have achieved, in actual practice
foreign investors often wielded greater influence. Studies indicate that
in situations where disagreements arose, the Workers Council would
29 Id.
30 See Coughlin, supra note 1, at 22.
31 See Scriven, supra note 4, at 653. (Foreign workers employed by the joint en-
terprise have the same self-management rights as their Yugoslav counterparts.)
32 Id. at 652. These rights can be found in arts. 98-100 of the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution.
31 See id.
3' The Business Board has responsibility for many important matters including
"financing, production, marketing, determination, and distribution of net income, and
definition and number of working positions .... [But the workers must still] approve
annual plans for wages, budget, profit, sales, and production." Id. at 652-53.
35 Id. at 652.
3' Id. at 653; Buzescu, supra note 1, at 428-29.
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frequently accept the opinion of the "technical experts."3 As the for-
eign investors and their representatives usually possessed the greater
technical expertise, they exercised the most influence in management
decisions. The 1984 Amendments served to clarify the Business Board's
autonomy and to ensure the representation of the foreign investors' in-
terests 8 that were "already informally operative in most joint ventures
under the 1978 legislation. 9
In November 1984, the Yugoslav Parliament passed a series of
amendments to the nation's joint venture laws. 40 These amendments
responded to the perceived shortcomings of the 1978 Foreign Invest-
ment Laws. There have been various explanations for the failure of the
1978 Laws to attract more foreign investment. Some feel that the Yugo-
slav economic system did not generate enough profits for the foreign
investors. 4' Others have faulted the required minority positions of the
foreign investors and extensive worker participation in management de-
cision-making.4 2 Because the actual level of foreign investment did not
meet Yugoslavia's expectations, Parliament enacted various amend-
ments to address these areas of concern.
The 1978 Foreign Investment Laws stipulated that profits re-
ceived from the joint venture's operations would be computed after de-
ducting from revenues, among other things, an amount corresponding
to "the expansion of the material basis of work."4 3 If the expanded
investments were financed by the foreign investor, the effect of this pro-
vision was to increase the profits of the domestic partner disproportion-
" Comment, supra note 1, at 167. (Artisien and Buckley found this to be true in
86% of the cases in their survey. They found the effective transfer of management
decisions to the technical experts to be in great part a result of the increasing technical
complexity of management decisions.)
" Artisien & Buckley, supra note 10, at 535 (specific measures to be found in
Articles 15-17 of the Joint Venture Laws).
S Id.
40 Law on Investment of Resources of Foreign Persons in Domestic (Yugoslav)
Organizations of Associated Labor, as amended November 27, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 315
(1984) [hereinafter 1984 Amendments].
41 See Coughlin, supra note 1, at 21 (referring to 1972 doctoral dissertation by
Huff, who faulted the Yugoslav legislation for several reasons: 1) it restricted the for-
eign investor's rights as to ownership, 2) a low real profit rate because of taxes, infla-
tion, devaluation and reinvestment requirements, 3) foreign exchange restrictions
preventing profit and capital repatriation, 4) the Yugoslav enterprise was inflexible,
and 5) foreign exchange and import controls raised doubts about the availability of
certain inputs).
" See id. (Discussing Gupta's studies, which concluded that six factors were caus-
ing the decreased investment. Besides the two mentioned, the other four were: 1)
prohibitions against certain aspects of wholly-owned subsidiaries, 2) foreigners' fears
and ignorance concerning Yugoslav legislation, 3) low profit rates, and 4) export re-
quirements and nonconvertibility of the dinar hindering profit repatriation.).
"' Coronna, supra note 1, at 268-69.
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ate to the size of its contribution to the investment." As a result, a
ceiling was placed on the profits to be made by the foreign investor.
45
The 1984 Amendments addressed this problem by removing these
profit ceilings. 46 Allowing the foreign investors to earn a more equitable
share of the profits will tend to encourage investment, which can only
aid the development of the Yugoslav economy and further economic ties
between Yugoslavia and the West.
Another limitation imposed by the 1978 Foreign Investment Laws
pertained to the allowable percentage of foreign ownership of the joint
venture. In general, foreigners were not permitted to own greater than
forty-nine percent of the venture's equity.47 Certain exceptions were
made, however, if the industry of which the joint venture was a part
"[was] of special interest for the development of a particular branch of
the economy."'48 The 1984 Amendments lifted from forty-nine percent
the maximum share of foreign ownership,49 allowing foreigners to in-
vest more liberally. Presumably, it will be easier for a Western investor
to find domestic Yugoslav partners (i.e., not necessarily partners able to
provide a majority of capital investment) and thus to invest more money
in these joint ventures.
There are other provisions of the 1984 Amendments which make
investing in Yugoslavia more attractive. First, new procedures regard-
ing the processing of applications for permission to create a joint ven-
ture have quickened the approval process.5" Second, Sections 8 and 10
" See id. at 269.
41 See id. at 272.
4' See Artisien & Buckley, supra note 10, 534-36 (Artisien and Buckley write
that although the removal of such profit ceilings is an attractive measure for foreign
investors, a problem still remains with the nonconvertibility of the dinar due to foreign
exchange restrictions. The lifting of such restrictions and the general health of the Yu-
goslav economy would act to more fully liberalize the joint venture laws in the area of
profit maximization.).
' See Jansen, Western Investment in State-Controlled Economies: Establishment
of Joint Ventures in Eastern European Countries, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
507, 511 (1980).
48 Id. (quoting from Article 1 of the 1978 Joint Venture Laws).
See Artisien & Buckley, supra note 10, at 535 (Artisien and Buckley argue that
this change is more cosmetic than substantial, having only a psychological effect on
potential investors. The reason for this is that the minority ownership requirement did
not constrain foreign investors who did not increase their risk capital ownership to the
legal maximum, as was encouraged by the Yugoslav authorities.); see also Comment,
supra note 1, at 168 (Author discusses results of survey indicating that the 49.9% max-
imum ownership level didn't really affect the investment decisions of foreign investors).
50 Article 50 requires the Federal Committee for Energy and Industry to inform
applicants of its decision within 60 days of receipt of the application. Also, unsuccessful
applicants may, under this amended provision, appeal this decision to the Federal Gov-
ernment. See Artisien & Buckley, supra note 10, at 534.
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make it easier for investors to borrow money to finance their ventures. 51
Third, amended Article 21 eases the tax burden on the foreign part-
ner. 52 There are also a number of other provisions in the amendments
designed to make Yugoslavia a more attractive place to invest.5"
The development of these Yugoslav laws pertaining to foreign in-
vestments in the form of joint ventures demonstrates the Yugoslav gov-
ernment's commitment to further economic ties with the West. Its
method of integrating foreign investment into its existing economic
structure and legal system give an element of stability to such ties and
make the prospect of further and more complete integration all the
more feasible.
2.2. Freedom of Contract
The legal infrastructure of the Yugoslav economy permits enter-
prises to contract freely with other parties as they wish. The Obliga-
tions Act54 provides enterprises with a great deal of latitude to decide
with whom to contract and for what.5 This, of course, is in keeping
with the decentralized, self-management nature of the Yugoslav econ-
omy. The right of institutions to manage their own enterprises and to
decide as well on the broader directions of the economy would be
meaningless without the ability to contract unencumbered by other en-
terprises. Yet this freedom to contract is still limited by the requirement
that the substance of the contracts be in keeping with requirements of
the parties' own plans, as agreed upon in the Social Compact. 56 This
proviso, however, is not very limiting when one considers that each en-
terprise has a say in the design of the plans to which it must adhere,
and that the plans can, of course, be altered. The Obligations Act
clearly underlines the market-oriented nature of the Yugoslav economy
by specifically stating that "obligations shall be regulated within the
framework of a free traffic in goods and services on the unified Yugo-
slav market."'
5 Provided that the borrowing does not exceed the amount invested by the con-
tracting parties. Also, it becomes easier to borrow from outside sources by allowing
these lenders to become co-signatories to the joint venture contract. See id.
52 The foreign partner need not pay taxes unrelated to the joint venture, including
taxes for defense, depreciation costs above statutory requirements, and some insurance
premiums. See id. at 535.
s' See id. at 534-36.
Law of Obligation Relations, March 30, 1978 [hereinafter Obligations Act].
For a general discussion of Yugoslav obligations law, see generally S. PEROVIC, OBLI-
GACIONO PRAVO (1980) (English summary on pages 793-832).
6 See Goldstajn, supra note 4, at 329.
5 See id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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The regulation of these contracts is on the level of private law."s
Yugoslavia does not differentiate between domestic and international
contracts in its application of the law in this area.59
2.3. Resolutions of Conflicts of Laws
Yugoslav law takes a modern approach toward resolving issues in-
volving conflicts of laws."0 The resolution of these conflicts is based on
the Yugoslav Private International Law Act. 1 The Yugoslav law fol-
lows the widely accepted practice of allowing the contracting parties
(when one of them is Yugoslav) to choose by which nation's law their
contract will be interpreted. 62 The only restrictions on this choice of
law are that it be made for lawful purposes 3 and that the application
of the chosen law not run contrary to Yugoslav public policy.64
The latitude given the contracting parties by these provisions facil-
itates the initiation and maintenance of business ties with Yugoslav en-
terprises. This aspect of the Yugoslav laws would be quite compatible
with the requirements of further economic integration with the Com-
munity that a merger with the EEC would necessitate.
There are no specific provisions in the Private International Law
Act regarding a court's acceptance of choices of law that are implicit in
the contract.65 Therefore, it is for a court to decide whether the claims
of such an implied choice are valid.66 In the past, courts have accepted
the claimed tacit choice if the behavior of the parties indicated that they
both intended the application of a specific law.67 This judicial discre-
tion and deference permits a certain degree of flexibility in the adminis-
tration of laws which potential foreign investors would find attractive.
8 See id. at 330; Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 577. See also Goldstajn, Yugoslav
Foreign Trade Law: A General Survey, 6 REv. SOCIALIST L. 325, 330 (1980) (The
legal basis for the private law nature lies in the Basic Principles of Obligations Act.
These principles are the following: 1) free regulation of obligations, 2) equality of par-
ties to obligations, 3) the duty to perform obligations, 4) the directory character of the
Act's provisions, and 5) the application of trade usages).
5' See Goldstajn, supra note 4, at 330. ("The same rules apply to both kinds of
transactions.")
60 See Sarcevic, The Yugoslav Private International Law Act, 33 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 283 (1985).
"' Yugoslav Private International Law Act, July, 1982 (translated in 2 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 222 (1983)).
62 See Sarcevic, supra note 60, at 292; Goldstajn, supra note 4, at 339; Goldstajn,
supra note 5, at 577.
63 See Goldstajn, supra note 4, at 339.
64 See id.; Sarcevic, supra note 60, at 285-86.
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2.4. Amenability to International Arbitration
Yugoslav law is quite amenable to the submission of matters to the
arbitration process for the resolution of international legal disputes.
Yugoslavia is a party to numerous arbitration conventions, including
the Geneva Convention of 1927, the Geneva Protocol of 1923, the Eu-
ropean Convention of 1961, and the Washington Convention of 1965.8
Yugoslav enterprises may choose from several forms of international
commercial arbitration, such as the Foreign Trade Arbitration in Bel-
grade, an ad hoc court of arbitration in Yugoslavia, or an institutional
or ad hoc arbitration tribunal abroad.69 The only restriction that the
law imposes with respect to the choice of arbitrators is that there must
be an uneven number selected.
70
As with the Yugoslav approach to conflicts of laws, the flexibility
accorded enterprises to choose the applicable laws for their contracts
serves as somewhat of an inducement-or at least does not act as a
deterrent-for foreign investment.7' Were further integration between
Yugoslavia and the Community to occur, the existing Yugoslav laws in
these areas would require little change.
2.5. Existing Yugoslav-EEC Trade Agreement
Aside from Yugoslavia's development of a legal framework that
would be compatible with further integration with Western Europe,
Yugoslavia has already created a legal arrangement governing the eco-
nomic relationship with the EEC: the Cooperation Agreement. 72 The
Cooperation Agreement covers the trade and exchange of both agricul-
tural and industrial goods,73 and allows for the expansion and intensifi-
cation of economic cooperation between the two parties to the Agree-
ment through diversification of their economic relations. 7 '
The Cooperation Agreement, however, does not mark the begin-
ning of the economic relations between Yugoslavia and the EEC.
Rather, it serves to further the economic integration that already exists.
The Member States of the Community have traditionally ranked
68 Id. at 295-96.
e Goldstajn, supra note 4, at 339; Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 577.
70 Goldstajn, supra note 4, at 339; Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 577.
71 In most cases, London is chosen as the place of arbitration for shipping and
insurance cases, Switzerland for ad hoc tribunals. See Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 578.
72 Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Apr. 2, 1980, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
41) 1 (1983) [hereinafter Cooperation Agreement].
71 See Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 571.
74 See id.
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among Yugoslavia's most important trading partners. 5 Their economic
contacts have progressed from the exchange of goods to the purchases of
"technology, technological equipment, raw materials and semi-finished
goods."76 These ties have expanded to include Yugoslav purchases of
foreign licenses, long-term co-production projects including production
of mutual supplies of products and the respective component parts,"
and business and technical cooperation consisting of "joint research,
production for joint marketing, [and] development of new products.""8
The specifics of the Cooperation Agreement are designed to pro-
mote closer economic ties with the European Community while al-
lowing for the specific needs of the developing Yugoslav economy. The
Cooperation Agreement aims specifically at expanding Yugoslavia's ba-
ses for international economic contact from tourism and the exchange of
goods to "higher forms in the international division of labour
through . . .joint venture contracts and contracts on industrial co-
operation."79
The Cooperation Agreement sets out industry-specific goals which
take into consideration the special needs of various sectors of the Yugo-
slav economy. It is clear that one of the goals regarding trade and ex-
change is to "ensur[e] a better balance and [to] eas[e] the conditions for
the admission of Yugoslav products to the Community's market." 0 Re-
garding industry, however, the goal is to develop the Yugoslav economic
infrastructure to the point where greater diversification is possible."' In
addition, the EEC will help to "promote technology transfer and to co-
operate in the field of energy including the exploration and utilization
of Yugoslavia's energy resources. 8 2 In return for helping develop the
Yugoslav economy, the European Economic Community was granted
most-favored-nation status in its trade relations with Yugoslavia."8
While designed to promote industrial development and closer eco-
nomic ties, the Cooperation Agreement also takes into consideration the
needs of both parties to protect themselves from economic harm caused
11 See id. at 570.
76 Id.
7 Id. at 571.
78 Id.
71 Id. at 574 (This specific goal is found in article 4 of the Cooperation Agree-
ment. Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Agreement indicate that the objectives of the Agreement
are to promote Yugoslavia's economic and social development, which complements Yu-
goslavia's efforts at its own development, while taking into account Yugoslavia's special
objectives and priorities as set forth in its development plans. Id.).
80 Id. (This is based on Article 14 of the Agreement).
81 See id.
82 Id. at 574-75.
83 See Cooperation Agreement, art. 27, at 10.
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by a number of potential problems. Those who oppose further integra-
tion might argue that the comparatively less-developed Yugoslav econ-
omy would not be able to withstand the strain of a heightened level of
economic integration with Western Europe. They would argue that the
underdeveloped production and technological capacities of Yugoslav in-
dustry, combined with its more volatile currency, would make Yugosla-
via too much of an importing nation and stunt the maturation of its
own economy. In the context of a pure free-trade arrangement, this
would be a more legitimate concern. However, several provisions in the
Cooperation Agreement recognize this problem and attempt to reconcile
the less-developed state of the Yugoslav economy with the Yugoslav de-
sire for closer economic ties with Western Europe.
The Cooperation Agreement contains several clauses which allow
either party to take measures to protect their economies when serious
imbalances occur. Article 29 permits Yugoslavia to introduce new trade
laws with respect to the EEC nations (i.e., customs, taxes or quotas) if
necessary to protect its processes of industrialization or development.
84
The Article stipulates, of course, that such measures should be those
that "least harm the trade and economic interests of the Community."
85
In addition, Yugoslavia may prohibit or restrict imports or exports "by
reasons of public morals, order and security, the protection of the
health and lives of persons and animals ... and the protection of indus-
trial and commercial property. " 86 This provision allows Yugoslavia a
good deal of latitude in applying such protectionist measures to ensure
the continued viability of its domestic industries, while still reaping the
developmental benefits of international trade.8"
Article 36 of the Cooperation Agreement provides that in urgent
situations involving the serious deterioration of a particular segment of
its economy, the affected party may adopt protectionist measures.88 A
party may also enact such measures to intervene temporarily in special
circumstances such as dumping or subsidies.89 One additional circum-
stance permitting intervention is to rectify a significant imbalance of
84 See Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 572.
85 Cooperation Agreement, art. 29, para. 2, at 10.
88 Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 573. See Cooperation Agreement, art. 34, at 11.
87 Article 34 serves also to limit to a certain degree Yugoslavia's imposition of
such protectionist measures. It requires that these measures must not be a form of
arbitrary discrimination or a concealed means to enact trade restrictions designed to
benefit only the Yugoslav economy. See Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 573.
8 See id.
" See id. The parties may adopt such protectionist measures in an attempt to
settle the situation, even without prior consultation. See Cooperation Agreement, art.
38, para. 2, at 11.
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payments. "
Thus, while the Cooperation Agreement is part of an effort to
draw Yugoslavia closer to the European Economic Community through
increased trade, it recognizes that the differences between the Yugoslav
economy and those of the Community's Member States require special
provisions to balance the inequities of a total free-trade agreement.
This is the sort of approach to economic integration that would make a
merger between Yugoslavia and the EC in the near future feasible. The
Cooperation Agreement proves that such arrangements are indeed
workable and should be pursued. Balancing the Yugoslav desire for in-
creased international trade and development with the need for minimal
protectionism would eventually create a Yugoslav economy that would
be more diversified, better developed, and fully able to contribute
strongly to the functioning of the Community.
3. THE LEGAL FIT OF YUGOSLAVIA INTO THE EEC
The overarching goal of the European Economic Community is to
gradually move toward full economic integration of the Community's
Member States9 "by establishing a common market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of Member States."92 Full integra-
tion, however, necessarily requires the Member States to sacrifice cer-
tain degrees of autonomy in the economic and legal realms.93
Economically, the Community seeks to eventually eliminate trade
restrictions between and among nations, 4 as well as restrictions as to
"freedom of movement for persons, services and capital." '95 The Treaty
of Rome also calls for the Member States to adopt common policies in
such areas as agriculture and transport.9" Legally, the Community calls
upon its members to sacrifice the jurisdiction of their courts in certain
areas to the Community's judicial system.9" Yugoslavia, because of its
" See Goldstajn, supra note 5, at 573. The other party must be informed of such
restrictions. Periodic consultations must be held to discuss how to cancel the provisions
as soon as conditions permit. See Cooperation Agreement, art. 40, at 11.
91 See generally Single European Act, Sept. 9, 1985, reprinted in TREATIES Es-
TABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 523 (abr. ed. 1987).
92 Treaty of Rome, art. 2.
9 For a discussion of the effort to more closely coordinate the foreign policies of
the Member States, see generally Coronna, supra note 1.
"' See Treaty of Rome, art. 3(a) (calling for the elimination of customs duties and
quotas on imports and exports of goods).
95 See id. art. 3(c).
9 See id. art. 3(d), (e).
The procedures governing the Community's Court of Justice and its jurisdiction
are set out in articles 164 to 188 of the Treaty of Rome. The Court has explicitly
stated in Costa v. Ente Mazionale per l'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), case 6/64 [1964]
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unique socio-political foundation and its resulting economic structure,
and because of the less-developed state of its economy, may be more
reluctant to make all of the sacrifices needed to help achieve the desired
integration. Whether Yugoslavia would be willing to take such steps,
and whether the laws of the EEC would allow for such recalcitrance by
one of its members, are major issues to be examined in evaluating the
feasibility of Yugoslavia's joining the Community.
3.1. The Primacy of Yugoslav Public Policy
Yugoslavia has specific laws prohibiting the application of foreign
laws that run contrary to Yugoslav public policy. This specific prohibi-
tion appears most saliently in Article 4 of the Yugoslav Private Interna-
tional Law Act of 1982.98 This Article provides that "[t]he law of a
foreign state shall not be applied if its application would be contrary to
the basic principles of social organization laid down by the Constitution
of"" Yugoslavia. Although this provision was designed for situations
involving conflicts of laws in which contracting parties choose to apply
to the contract laws of a foreign nation, the logic behind the provision
indicates that it could be applied more broadly. In enacting this provi-
sion, Yugoslavia recognized the unique position in which it had placed
itself. By encouraging closer economic ties with Western enterprises
E.C.R. 585, 3 Common Mkt. L. Rep. 425 (1964) that Community laws, as established
by the Community and as interpreted by its courts, must be applied by national courts
when conflicts of law arise. Clark, Legal Principles of Non-Socialist Economic Inte-
gration as Exemplified by the European Economic Community, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 1, 20-21 (1980). Although some nations comply with this judicial theory,
others find ways to circumvent the authority of the Community courts, either procedur-
ally or through the interpretation of national constitutional provisions. See id. at 21.
Some nations elect to apply constitutional provisions that specifically transfer jurisdic-
tion to the Community's courts. Italian courts have upheld article 11 of the Italian
Constitution which "enables Italy to consent equally with other states to limit its sover-
eignty 'in so far as this may be necessary to enable the creation of any organization
assuring peace and justice among nations.' " Id. at 21-22. Greece amended its Constitu-
tion before it joined the Community so that paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 28 effectively
transfer national powers to international agencies and limit the exercise of national
sovereignty in particular areas. Evrigenis, Legal and Constitutional Implications of
Greek Accession to the European Communities, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 157, 159
(1980). Evrigenis writes that these provisions were indeed modeled on similar clauses
in present Member States. See id. at 160.
It is likely, considering its demonstrated flexibility in sacrificing national sover-
eignty in international law, that Yugoslavia will similarly enact such constitutional pro-
visions. Yugoslavia's willingness to allow contracting parties to choose the applicable
law of contract, its liberal Private International Law Act, and its amenability to the
resolution of disputes through international arbitration all attest to its readiness to sac-
rifice a certain degree of national sovereignty in order to further economic integration
with the West.
"8 See supra note 61.
9 See id. art. 4.
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through the acceptance of the applicability of foreign laws, Yugoslavia
exposed its less-developed economy to the laws, customs, and practices
of nations with more sophisticated and highly-developed economies. In
order to ensure the integrity and vitality of its unique socio-economic
structure in the face of foreign influence, Yugoslavia had to ensure that
certain key aspects of its law and public policy were not compromised.
Thus, they enacted the provision concerning the primacy of their public
policy.
Therefore, when faced with the possibility that the EEC would
demand strict adherence to Community laws concerning the inviolabil-
ity, of the doctrine of unfettered free trade among Member States,"°'
Yugoslavia may decide that the goal of preserving its system of worker
self-management calls for a slower pace of economic integration. It is
the possibility of such an impasse which requires an examination of the
potential conflicts between Community laws and Yugoslavia's goals.
3.2. EEC Laws Against Restricting Free Competition
This conflict between domestic sovereignty and free trade appears
frequently in the context of EEC rules regarding restrictions on compe-
tition. Article 85101 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits two or more eco-
100 See supra note 94.
101 The text of article 85 reads as follows:
(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly oi indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall
be automatically void.
(3) The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices which contributes
to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting tech-
nical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not:
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nomic enterprises from collaborating to restrict competition through
such means as fixing prices, limiting or controlling production of in-
vestments, or sharing markets or sources of supply.10 2 By examining
the Community's case law, one can begin to determine what constitutes
prohibited collusion.
The courts that have addressed this issue have focused on two
questions. First, they seek to determine whether there exists a strong
degree of "economic unity"'0 3 between the enterprises in question.
Christian v. Nielson,"' a case involving parent-subsidiary interaction,
held that enterprises that are so economically interdependent that there
can be no fully independent decision-making by one of the enterprises
does not violate Article 85. The court reasoned that such interdepen-
dence essentially necessitates a sort of economic cooperation that does
not rise to the level of collusion between two or more enterprises. In
Bguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export S.A.,"0 5 the Court of Jus-
tice "strongly endorsed the Commission's reasoning in Christian [v.]
Nielson."106 It essentially focused on the degree of competition between
the two enterprises in question in order to ascertain whether they
themselves were actually capable of restricting competition.'
The second question on which the courts focus is the existence of
specific agreements between the enterprises to limit competition. In Ko-
dak,' O8 the Commission chose to look at the existence of such agree-
ments as the basis for a determination of collusion, rather than follow-
ing Christian and looking to the realities of the nature of economic
interdependence.
Either approach toward this issue still presents a problem for Yu-
goslavia. Yugoslav enterprises, as discussed earlier, are independently
managed and are free to make decisions regarding their operations.
Therefore, the approach taken in Christian and BNguelin affords no
protection. More importantly, the Yugoslavs might face a problem with
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indis-
pensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
102 See Treaty of Rome, art. 85, §§ I (a-c).
.03 See generally Ward, The Economic Unity Doctrine in the EEC: A Limited
Exemption to Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 373.
10" 12 J.O. Comm. Eur. (No. L 165) 12 (1969), translated in [1965-1969 Trans-
fer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) % 9308.
15 1 Common Mkt. L. Rep. 81 (1974).
106 Ward, supra note 103, at 386.
107 See id.
108 13 J.O. Comm. Eur. (No. L 147) 24 (special ed. 1970), translated in [1969-
1973 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 9378.
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the Kodak approach because of their practice of creating Social Com-
pacts. The Yugoslav system of Social Compacts might be perceived as a
restriction on competition in violation of Article 85. As mentioned ear-
lier, the Social Compacts are a form of cooperation among Yugoslav
enterprises to achieve broad macroeconomic objectives. As no cases are
directly on point, there is a question as to whether these general agree-
ments violate Article 85. But, an -analysis of both the nature of the
Yugoslav Social Compacts and the logic behind Article 85 indicates that
they do not constitute such violations.
Article 85 is intended to prevent companies from engaging in ac-
tions designed to restrict or distort competition within the Common
Market.1 °9 This would obviously include behavior designed to change
price levels or affect the supplies of goods. But the Act is designed to
prohibit behavior intended by its participants to reap benefits for the
enterprises engaged in the action. The relevant cases have all dealt with
agreements where the enterprises in question sought to utilize a specific
means that they knew would affect the market in a particularly advan-
tageous way. However, the Yugoslav Social Compacts are much more
general in nature. Every enterprise plays a role in their formulations,
not just two or three. Therefore, aside from the sheer burden of design-
ing a plan that would distort the Community market in order to benefit
an entire Yugoslav industry, a court would have to find that the plan
was specifically designed to benefit the entire Yugoslav nation, or at
least one whole sector of the economy. Given the competitive nature of
the Yugoslav economy, it seems unreasonable to expect that such an
agreement would be desirable or even achievable.
Furthermore, because the Yugoslav Social Compacts are quite
general in nature, they deal with the broadest sort of macroeconomic
objectives for the economy as a whole. They establish broad directions
of policy for all enterprises to follow. The decentralized and competitive
nature of worker self-management necessitates the sort of independence
for individual enterprises that is incompatible with a finding of collu-
sion under Article 85.
3.3. Permissibility of State Aids
In its effort to promote free trade within the Community, the EEC
has enacted laws restricting the ability of Member Nations to provide
forms of aid or assistance to domestic corporations. 110 Article 92(1) of
109 See Treaty of Rome, art. 85(1).
.1 One commentator lists some possible forms of state aid as reduced utility rates,
supply of free land or buildings, free research or promotional assistance, exemption
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the Treaty of Rome explicitly forbids "aid granted . . . in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favour-
ing certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. .... I"
This law is designed to better achieve the general EEC goal of integrat-
ing the European market through the elimination of all forms of trade
restriction." 2 Although such state aids do not explicitly set up restric-
tions or barriers to trade, they distort the normal functioning of free
markets. This leads to a less efficient allocation of economic resources
and can compromise the integrity and vitality of the Common Market.
In addition, some state aids act to "raise trade barriers and produce
unemployment and overcapacity in the industries of Member
States." '' 1
The Court of Justice of the European Community recently ex-
panded the scope of Article 93(2) of the Treaty of Rome, which gives
the Court jurisdiction over cases involving state aids. In the case of
Compagnie Francaise de l'Azote (COFAZ) S.A. v. Commission," 4 the
Court held for the first time that a business enterprise may seek review
before the Court of Justice of another nation's state aid law, even after
it has already addressed the issue before the government of the other
nation."' The resulting increased admissibility of state aid cases marks
the Community's increased willingness to entertain such cases and "to
consider a broad range of factors when determining the admissibility of
individual complaints concerning Community measures.""' 6 Consider-
ing the need for aid to promote economic growth in some less-developed
areas of the Yugoslav economy, the issue of the permissibility of state
aids becomes an important consideration in evaluating the feasibility of
a Yugoslav-EEC merger.
Article 92(2)(a) of the Treaty of Rome says that state aid based
upon social or public welfare grounds are per se compatible with the
Common Market." 7 A strong argument can be made that the provision
allows for a flexible approach to providing assistance to individual con-
from anti-pollution regulations, financial contributions to capital equipment or interest
costs, and reductions or refunds for taxes or social security payments. See Allen, The
New Standard for Admissibility in European Community State Aids Actions After
COFAZ, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 578, 579-80 n.7 (1987) (Discussing analysis from 3
H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 5-
572-73 (1986)).
... Treaty of Rome, art. 92(1).
112 See Allen, supra note 110, at 579.
113 Id. at 595.
114 Case 169/84 [1986] E.C.R. 391, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,284.
115 See Allen, supra note 110, at 578.
116 Id.
117 See id. at 580 n.12.
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sumers or by extension to enterprises which serve important social and
economic functions. Additionally, Article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty of
Rome considers state aid "to promote the economic development of ar-
eas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is
serious underemployment" as per se compatible with the Common
Market. Thus, Yugoslavia, were it to join the Community, could con-
tinue to take measures designed to speed up growth in particularly un-
derdeveloped areas of its economy.
3.4. Possibility of the EEC Excepting Yugoslavia from Certain Re-
quirements of Membership
On a more general level, the European Economic Community has
recognized that there frequently exist circumstances peculiar to certain
Member States under which these states should not be held to adher-
ence to particular rules. It is necessary in an organization of nations of
disparate circumstances to make such allowances. Therefore, some com-
mon rules exempt certain states from conformity with these rules, ei-
ther for temporary or unlimited periods of time."" In the cases involv-
ing unlimited periods, these exceptions "are considered harmless
because of their economic insignificance.""' 9 There also exist such ex-
ceptions based upon political reasons. 2 Yugoslavia could receive cer-
tain exceptions on such political grounds because of the demands of its
unique system of worker self-management.
While some exceptions are made explicitly to specific rules, an-
other means of accommodating the various needs of the different states
is to establish and apply different standards for each state based upon
its special circumstances. 2 ' One form of this approach involves estab-
lishing alternative means of compliance.' 22 A second method seeks to
establish minimum standards, where the states are given the option of
introducing more stringent standards in addition to the established base
standards.' Finally, there are a number of provisions in the various
11 See Grabitz & Langeheine, Legal Problems Related to a Proposed "Two-Tier
System" of Integration Within the European Community, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
33, 36 (1981).
119 Id. An example of such an exception "can be found in the Sixth Council Di-
rective on turnover taxes, [which excluded] certain territories of Denmark, Italy, and
the Federal Republic of Germany." Id.
1 20 An example is the Protocol on German Internal Trade in 1957. See id.
121 See generally id. at 37-38.
122 See id. at 37 (Grabitz and Langeheine give as an example the Fourth Council
Directive on the annual accounts of certain kinds of companies which allows nations to
choose between different layouts of balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.).
123 See id. at 37 (Grabitz and Langeheine point out that these standards are fre-
quently used in environmental protection legislation.).
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treaties and agreements among the Community members exempting
certain areas of state activity from EEC control.' The existence of
such provisions allowing for the special circumstances of different states
demonstrates that the EEC already has some experience with managing
the difficulties of integrating a group of disparate nations. 2 ' Such flexi-
bility would be necessary to accommodate the merger of Yugoslavia,
with all of its unique needs.
4. CONCLUSION
Yugoslavia is presently in a good position to join the European
Economic Community. Its geographic position makes it a desirable link
between Western Europe, the Near East and the Southern Mediterra-
nean. Since the goal of the EEC is to unify the markets of its Member
States so as to make the resulting collective market more self-contained,
it would make sense to extend membership to nations having something
unique to offer. Yugoslavia offers potentially high levels of industrial
and agricultural production.
Its admission would demonstrate the Community's flexibility and
openness in accepting a nation with a unique market system. If the
EEC ever considers expanding its membership beyond Western Europe
- perhaps to include more oil-producing nations - the experience gained
in encouraging Yugoslav integration would be most beneficial.
As for the process of integrating Yugoslavia into the Common
Market, the economic and legal climates in Yugoslavia make a merger
with the EEC quite feasible. It would initially require some special
accommodations in order to eventually bring the Yugoslav economy to a
greater degree of equality with the rest of the Community, but the
Community already makes such accommodations for some of its present
members.
The only question remaining is the political one. The Yugoslav
government must decide whether a full merger would compromise its
present form of government, and whether the increased exposure to the
West - its politics and its culture - would add to the likelihood of this
occurrence. Such a question is particularly relevant considering the re-
"24 See id. at 37-38 (Two examples of such provisions are Articles 48(4) and 55 of
the Treaty of Rome regarding the rights of workers in the public service and the right
of establishment, respectively.).
125 Grabitz and Langeheine have proposed the idea of establishing a "Two-Tier
System" of economic integration within the Comm-unity. They argue that a system of
"formal inequality" would allow more flexibility and mutual assistance in helping
Member Nations more efficiently. See generally Grabitz & Langeheine, supra note
118.
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cent political and ethnic turmoil in Yugoslavia.
Until now, however, the Yugoslav government has demonstrated a
strong commitment to the pursuit of closer ties with the West. Its ef-
forts to attract foreign investment and its willingness to open its econ-
omy demonstrate a desire for further integration. The question now
remains as to how far the Yugoslavs are willing to go.
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